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CASE NOTES
This latter decision is the one which the majority of the court in the
instant case reversed and remanded.
The Illinois statutes provide for notice to a resident by publication only
where the defendant has gone out of the state, or on due inquiry cannot
be found, or is concealed within the state, so that he cannot be served.3 8
Thus it can be seen that the notice requirement in Illinois complies with
the Due Process Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the instant
case.
38111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 47, S§ 4, 5, c. 110 §§ 14, 15.
CONTRACTS-FRUSTRATION INAPPLICABLE TO
RESTRICTIVE ZONING LAWS EXISTING
WHEN PREMISES LEASED
Plaintiff obtained a judgment by confession for rent pursuant to an
executed lease. Defendant sought to vacate the judgment on the grounds
that when the lease was executed, both the plaintiff and the defendant
contemplated that the premises would be used for the manufacturing of
automotive parts; and that after the execution of the lease and occupation
of the premises by the defendant, the defendant was notified by a city
building inspector that the use being made of the premises violated an
existing zoning ordinance; and that the foregoing facts constituted impos-
sibility of performance on the part of the defendant. The court held that
the primary promise of a lessee is to pay rent and there is nothing legally
impossible about paying such rent; therefore, the doctrine of commercial
frustration was not applicable because the zoning ordinance was in exist-
ence at the time of the making of the lease. Warshawsky v. American
Automotive Products, 12 Ill. App. 2d 178, 138 N. E. 2d 816 (1956).
Although the doctrine of frustration has been mentioned in cases
throughout the United States, there is not, as can best be determined, a
court of last resort which has expressly applied it or Section 288 of the
Restatement of Contracts' in determining the final outcome of a contracts
case.2 Here, an intermediate court in Illinois, in a rare instance, mentions
the doctrine but does not apply it, pursuant to the vast majority of deci-
sions of courts throughout the United States.
I Where the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect to be attained by either
party to a contract forms the basis on which both parties enter into it, and this object
or effect is or surely will be frustrated, a promisor who is without fault in causing the
frustration, and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from the duty of performing his
promise unless a contrary intention appears. Rest., Contracts § 288 (1932).
2 Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933), was a case where the court based
its authority on S 288 of the Restatement of Contracts but actually used real property
and equity principles without mentioning the doctrine of frustration.
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In analyzing the origin and application of the doctrine of frustration,
Professor Anderson observes:3
The doctrine of frustration is the doctrine which grew from the Corona-
tion Cases. In each of the two principal Coronation Cases,4 the facts involved
a contract between the owner of premises situated along the route of the cor-
onation procession, and a hirer under which the hirer promised to pay a large
sum of money to the owner, and, in exchange, the owner promised to allow
the hirer to occupy the premises during the time scheduled for the procession.
The procession was postponed on account of the illness of the king. In Krell v.
Henry, the Court of Appeal held that the hirer was discharged of the duty to
pay the money, but several months later, in Chandler v. Webster, the Court of
Appeal held that the hirer remained under a duty to pay.
This was clearly a contract to rent, the performance of which remained
entirely possible. The owner was capable of renting, and the hirer of pay-
ing. The disappointment suffered by the hirer did not excuse him from
being liable for his rent.5
The defendant in the instant case contended that performance on his
part had become impossible due to the frustration of the contract. It is to
be noted that frustration and impossibility are not synonymous; rather,
each has its individual legal implications which are totally unrelated in
theory from the other. In frustration, "performance remains possible, but
the expected value of performance to the party seeking to be excused has
been destroyed by a fortuitous event, which supervenes to cause an actual
but not literal failure of consideration."
This restriction on the scope of the applicability of the doctrine-to
situations where performance is possible but undesirable-must be empha-
sized so as not to be misled by the language to the contrary in Leonard v.
Autocar Sales and ServiceT where the court stated:
3 Anderson, Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 De Paul L. Rev. 1 (1953).
4 Krell v. Henry 11903] 2 K.B. 740; Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
5 Diebler v. Bernard Bros., Inc., 385 111. 610, 617, 53 N.E. 2d 450, 453 (1944) where the
court stated: "It would certainly be an innovation to establish a rule that all lessees,
affected in the same way, were relieved from the obligations of their leases. It would be
most difficult to suggest a business which has not been affected in some way by the pre-
vailing conditions. It would not be an exaggeration to assert that the business of every
retail dealer and merchant in the land has been reduced because of his inability to ob-
tain an adequate supply of goods to meet the necessities of his former customers. It is
common knowledge that retail business generally, and of every kind, has been made
more difficult and, no doubt, on the whole, less profitable, by innumerable restrictions
and governmental regulations. If all such merchants and others, for that reason, are to be
relieved of the obligations of their contracts, then every butcher, grocer, merchant and
other dealer, could abandon his lease with impunity. All such lease contracts would be
wiped out with one fell swoop, because their business had become less profitable."
6 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P. 2d 47, 50 (1944).
7 392 Ill. 182, 187, 64 N.E. 2d 477, 479 (1945), cert. denied 327 U.S. 804 (1946).
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The doctrine of frustration is an extension of this exception (where from the
nature of the contract it is apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of
the continued existence of the particular person or thing, it is always implied
that the death or destruction of that person or thing shall excuse performance)
to cases where the cessation or nonexistence of some particular condition or
state of things has rendered performance impossible8 and the object of the con-
tract frustrated.
The use of the word "impossible" in Leonard v. Autocar Sales and
Service9 and as defendant used it as being part of the doctrine of frustra-
tion in the instant case is erroneous, because, as stated, impossibility oc-
curs where, owing to the nature of the performance, it cannot be done;
in frustration, however, the performance is possible, but it is undesirable
to one of the parties.' 0
The doctrine of frustration is most frequently raised in the field of
leases. During World War II many leased premises were restricted by
government orders from operating as the parties had contemplated they
would. Courts of last resort uniformly held the tenant liable for the rent
in these situations."
The importance of these . . .cases may be diminished by the common-law
real property rule that the destruction of a building on the leased premises
does not end the tenant's liability for rent. If a tenant remains liable for rent
after the building has been destroyed, it would seem obvious that he should re-
main liable where he suffers some other and lesser casualty. 12
8 Italics added.
9 Authority cited note 7 supra.
10 See note 6 supra; 6 Williston, Contracts S 1935 (rev. ed., 1938): "Performance re-
mains entirely possible, but the whole value of the performance to one of the parties
at least, and the basic reason recognized as such by both parties, for entering into the
contract has been destroyed by a supervening and unforseen event. This does not
operate primarily as an excuse for the promisor, the performance of whose promise
has lost its value, but as a failure of consideration for the promise of the other party,
not in a literal sense it is true, since the performance bargained for can be given, (italics
added) but in substance, because the performance has lost its value. The name 'frus-
tration' has been given to this situation." Accord: Dorm v. Goetz, 85 Cal. App. 2d 407,
193 P. 2d 121 (1948); also, Gray Milling Co. v. Sheppard, 359 Mo. 505, 222 S.W. 2d 742,
748 (1949), where the court said: "If a party by his contract charge himself with an
obligation possible to be performed, he must make it good unless its performance is
rendered impossible by an Act of God, the law, or the other party. Unforseen (italics
added) difficulties, however great, will not excuse him." (This court rejects the doc-
trine of frustration completely; and if unforseen difficulties will not excuse perform-
ance, then it would follow that forseen events certainly will not.)
11 See notes 6--7, supra; Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires, Ltd., 25 Cal. 2d 45, 153 P. 2d 53
(1944); Frazier v. Collins, 300 Ky. 18, 187 S.W. 2d 816 (1945); Nickolopulos v. Lehrer,
132 N.J.L. 461, 40 A. 2d 794 (1945), cert. denied 325 U.S. 876; Wood v. Bartolino, 48
N.M. 175, 146 P. 2d 883 (1944).
12 Anderson, Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 De Paul L. Rev. 1, 17
(1953); Lind v. Spannuth, 3 Ill. App. 2d 112, 120 N.E. 2d 381 (1954).
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The instant case would fall into such a category. Here, the leased
premises were available for occupancy and could be used by the tenant
for any purpose he desired with the exception of a certain type of auto-
motive manufacturing. He could even have used the premises for a slightly
different type of automotive manufacturing. Clearly then, this should not
permit a frustration type defense, for there was an existing zoning law in
effect when this lease was entered into. As a California court reasoned:
.. The answer depends on whether an unanticipated' circumstance, the risk
of which should not be fairly thrown on the promisor, has made performance
vitally different from what was reasonably expected. The purpose of a contract
is to place the risks of performance upon the promisor and the relation of the
parties, terms of the contract, and circumstances surrounding its formation must
be examined to determine whether it can be fairly inferred that the risk of the
event that has supervened to cause the alleged frustration was not reasonably
forseeable. If it was forseeable there should have been provision for it in the
contract (or the party should have checked existing zoning laws), and the ab-
sence of such a provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed.
... The courts have required a promisor seeking to excuse himself from perfor-
mance of his obligations to prove that the risk of the frustrating event was not
reasonably forseeable14 and that the value of counterperformance is totally or
nearly destroyed, for frustration is no defense if it was forseeable .... 15
Consequently, it logically follows that where there is a forseeable situ-
ation which will disappoint a party to a contract, he cannot claim the
doctrine of frustration as a defense, even if it were accepted and applied
by the courts of last resort.' 6 This corollary is a necessary conclusion
derived from the undisputed premise that where there is an existing law,
such law is to be taken into consideration by the parties prior to the
execution of the contract, as such laws are clearly forseeable.
The effect of a contrary result was considered by an Illinois court:
If individuals were permitted to void solemn obligations because of ignor-
ance of existing laws in force at the time of the execution of said instrument,
then such existing laws would become useless and of no value.17
Moreover, the same court' s discussed the presumption that everyone
knows the law, declaring:
18 Italics added. 14 Italics added.
15 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P. 2d 47, 50 (1944). See Phelps v. School Dist.
No. 109, 302 111. 193, 134 N.E. 312 (1922); see Dean v. Lowery, 50 111. App. 254 (1893);
Bunn v. Prather, 21 111. 217 (1859).
16 Accord: Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires, Ltd., 25 Cal. 2d 45, 153 P. 2d 53 (1944); Raner
v. Goldberg, 244 N.Y. 438, 155 N.E. 733 (1927); Shedd-Bartush Foods of Illinois v.
Commodity Credit Corp., 135 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ill., 1955), aff'd. 231 F. 2d 555 (1956).
(The court rejected the doctrine of frustration, holding that the event was in contem-
plation of the parties.)
17 Kazwell v. Reynolds, 250 111. App. 174, 177 (1928).
18 Ibid.
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If ... neither party knew of that fact, then it becomes the duty of the pur-
chaser to have advised himself as to whether or not such an ordinance was in
existence.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the doctrine of
frustration is an attempted defense by a disappointed party to a contract
who finds his required performance possible, but undesirable, in that the
forseeable object contemplated by both parties has become unforseeably
no longer obtainable. This doctrine has been universally rejected by
American courts of last resort. The contract remains possible of perform-
ance, as in the instant case, and mere disappointment in the final outcome
of the bargain, or failure to adequately and wisely draft contracts, or to
investigate existing laws which are clearly forseeable, offer no legal de-
fense to a contract.
CRIMINAL LAW-ABILITY TO RESIST PSYCHOLOGICAL
COERCION A FACTOR IN DETERMINING
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF CONFESSION
Fikes, an uneducated Negro of low mentality, was picked up by Selma,
Alabama police and charged with breaking and entering the apartment
of the mayor's daughter and attempting to rape her. Booked on an "open
charge of investigation," Fikes was not taken before a magistrate per
Alabama law but was locked up in the Selma jail the night of the arrest.
The following morning police officers questioned petitioner for three
hours. The next day he was questioned for another two hours in the
morning, and that afternoon he was taken to Kilby State Prison, roughly
fifty-five miles from Selma. At the prison there were several hours of
interrogation and similar questioning for two more days, after which
Fikes confessed. Counsel was admitted after the confession was obtained,
marking the first time Fikes had come in contact with anyone other than
the police officers, the sheriff of Selma, and his employer. At no time
prior to the first confession was Fikes allowed to see relatives or friends.
After another week of similar interrogation Fikes gave a second confes-
sion. He was subsequently convicted in a trial in which the evidence
against him consisted of the challenged confessions and two witnesses who
testified that petitioner had previously attacked them. The mayor's
daughter failed to identify petitioner as her assailant. Petitioner's convic-
tion was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama, which in turn was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court holding that the failure
to take the defendant before a magistrate and the incarceration in isolation
for a week of questioning, coupled with defendant's low mentality, ren-
dered the confessions obtained thereby involuntary and their use a vio-
lation of petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
